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Abstract We investigated the spontaneous brain electric
activity of 13 skeptics and 16 believers in paranormal
phenomena; they were university students assessed with a
self-report scale about paranormal beliefs. 33-channel EEG
recordings during no-task resting were processed as
sequences of momentary potential distribution maps. Based
on the maps at peak times of Global Field Power, the
sequences were parsed into segments of quasi-stable
potential distribution, the ‘microstates’. The microstates
were clustered into four classes of map topographies
(A–D). Analysis of the microstate parameters time coverage,
occurrence frequency and duration as well as the temporal
sequence (syntax) of the microstate classes revealed sig-
nificant differences: Believers had a higher coverage and
occurrence of class B, tended to decreased coverage and
occurrence of class C, and showed a predominant sequence
of microstate concatenations from A to C to B to A that
was reversed in skeptics (A to B to C to A). Microstates of
different topographies, putative ‘‘atoms of thought’’, are
hypothesized to represent different types of information
processing.The study demonstrates that personality differ-
ences can be detected in resting EEG microstate parameters
and microstate syntax. Microstate analysis yielded no
conclusive evidence for the hypothesized relation between
paranormal belief and schizophrenia.
Keywords Microstate syntax  Cognition 
Paranormal beliefs  Schizotypy  Transition
probabilities  Schizophrenia
Introduction
The functional state of the brain changes continually, even
if there are no stimuli or tasks. The brain’s processing of a
given, external or internal information depends on the
momentary functional state. Brain state can be monitored
by electroencephalography (EEG) at the split-second speed
needed for successful interaction with the surround.
Multichannel EEG displayed as sequence of momentary
potential topographies (maps) shows quasi-stable configu-
rations (mean duration of about 100 ms for spontaneous
EEG) called functional microstates (Lehmann et al. 1987)
that are concatenated by rapid transitions. Different
microstates have been attributed to different types of cog-
nitive processes (Britz et al. 2009; Lehmann et al. 1998,
2010; Mohr et al. 2005; Mu¨ller et al. 2005) qualifying them
for ‘‘atoms of thought’’ (Lehmann et al. 2010). Microstate
topographies during no-task resting can be clustered into
four map configurations that explain[80% of the total data
variance (Koenig et al. 2002). These four classes have been
observed in independent studies with notable similarity
across subjects (Koenig et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005).
Microstate parameters (duration, frequency of occurrence)
of the four classes differ between schizophrenics and
controls (Irisawa et al. 2006; Kikuchi et al. 2007; Koenig
et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005). The temporal concate-
nation of microstates (‘syntax’) showed non-random
behavior in healthy participants (Wackermann et al. 1993).
Also, microstate syntax exhibited a particular, deviant
pattern in untreated schizophrenics compared to controls
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(Lehmann et al. 2005). Thus, the syntax of microstates may
reflect personal cognitive strategies.
The EEG microstate concept was supported by fMRI
studies where the time courses of microstates when con-
voluted with the hemodynamic response allowed to predict
the BOLD signatures of resting-state networks (‘RSNs’)
(Britz et al. 2010; Musso et al. 2010) which display slower
spontaneous fluctuations (about 10 s for no-task condi-
tions) of the coherences of the BOLD response (Mantini
et al. 2007); microstates were thus suggested to represent
the underlying electrophysiological basis of RSNs. This is
due to the monofractal, scale-free dynamics of microstate
sequences, i.e., the information contained in the temporal
dynamics of microstates is preserved over large timescales
(Van De Ville et al. 2010).
Inspired by the universality of EEG microstates, we
wondered whether personality features of healthy people
were also reflected in the parameters and syntax of
microstates.
Using a previously obtained dataset (Pizzagalli et al.
2000), we examined microstates during spontaneous awake
no-task resting EEG of participants who differ in their
belief in paranormal phenomena.
Materials and Methods
352 university students answered a questionnaire (4-point
scale) about belief in and experience of paranormal phe-
nomena (Mischo et al. 1993). 117 agreed to participate in a
subsequent EEG recording. Because 91 of the volunteers
were women, men were excluded from the further assess-
ment to avoid gender as a confounding factor. The ques-
tionnaire consists of 6 items, concerning mainly telepathy
and precognition, and results in a score from 0 (strong
skepticism) to 18 (strong belief in paranormal phenomena).
Volunteers in the upper and lower 33% of the paranormal
belief scale were accepted if right-handed, and native
German speakers without personal or family history of
psychiatric disorders. 19 ‘believers’ and 18 ‘skeptics’
remained for recordings. Eight persons with\10 s artifact-
free EEG had to be excluded, leaving 16 believers (score
range 15–18) and 13 skeptics (score range 0–6) for anal-
ysis. The two groups of participants did not differ in age,
handedness and education level.
The study protocol was approved by the local Ethics
Committee. Participants gave their written consent and
were financially compensated.
Thirty-five EEG electrodes referenced to Cz were
attached according to the 10–10 system (Chatrian et al.
1988). Electrodes at the outer left and right canthus and
infraorbital monitored eye movements. Participants were
comfortably seated in a sound- and light-shielded recording
chamber. They were told that the recording will be done
during no-task resting with closed or open eyes, requested
via intercom, consisting of 20 s eyes open; 40 s eyes closed;
20 s eyes open; 40 s eyes closed. EEG was continuously
recorded with 0.05–60 Hz band pass, digitized at 250 sam-
ples/s/channel. Only eyes closed recordings were used for
analysis.
Eye movement artifacts were removed using ICA
(BrainVision Analyzer 2.0, Brain Products, Munich,
Germany), followed by careful manual screening for other
artifacts using most conservative criteria. No further arti-
fact correction was done (not even interpolating single time
frames), but all artifact time frames were omitted. Channels
O9 and O10 were removed because of frequent muscle
artifacts in most participants, leaving 33 channels. The data
were eventually segmented into artifact-free 2 s epochs and
digitally band passed to 2–20 Hz. Across participants, on
average there was 27.7 ± 8.0 s (25.9 ± 8.4 s) for believers
(skeptics) of 33-channel artifact-free eyes-closed EEG.
For microstate analysis (Koenig et al. 2002; Lehmann
et al. 1987, 2005), all momentary (potential distribution)
maps at peak times of global field power (GFP) (Lehmann
and Skrandies 1980) after normalization to GFP = 1 were
clustered into four map topographies using k-means clus-
tering (Pascual-Marqui et al. 1995). Across participants,
the topographies of the four microstate classes explained
84.0 ± 5.1% of the total variance. The four map topogra-
phies of each participant were labeled according to the best
fit microstate topography of classes A, B, C, D in a nor-
mative study (Koenig et al. 2002). The four labeled indi-
vidual microstate maps of each participant were used to
label the sequential momentary maps at peak times of GFP,
resulting in time sequences of the four microstate classes.
An average map was computed for each microstate class
for each participant. Separately for the two participant
groups, an average map for each of the four microstate
classes was computed across participants. The microstate
map topographies were tested for global differences of the
spatial potential distributions between groups using
TANOVA (Strik et al. 1998). The program calculates Global
Map Dissimilarity (Lehmann and Skrandies 1980) as mea-
sure of the global difference between two map topographies
and establishes the exact probability of the observed differ-
ence using a randomization procedure. Channel-wise t-tests
specified the spatial distributions of the differences.
The three microstate parameters of mean duration, fre-
quency of occurrence per second, and percentage of
occupied total analysis time (‘coverage’) were computed
for each of the four microstate classes of each participant.
In addition, the frequency of GFP peaks per second was
established for each microstate class and all participants.
Since microstate parameters were calculated for each 2 s
epoch separately, the duration of the microstate at the
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beginning and the end of an epoch were truncated, on
average by 50%. We corrected the microstate mean dura-
tions by applying Eq. 1 (provided by Thomas Koenig) to
the durations of each microstate class of each participant:
durationcorrectedðms)
¼ durationobserverdðmsÞ  ðoccurrence þ coverageÞ
occurrence
ð1Þ
where durationcorrected is the corrected mean duration of the
microstates of class X, durationobserved is the computed
mean duration of the microstates of class X, occurrence is
the number of occurrences of microstates of class X
observed during the analyzed time epoch, and coverage is
the fraction of time of the analyzed epoch covered by the
microstates of class X.
The three microstate parameters were assessed using
ANOVAs with group (believers, skeptics) as between-
subject factor and microstate class (A, B, C, D) as within-
subject factor.
The concatenation of the microstate classes over time
(‘microstate syntax’) was examined as follows: The num-
ber of transitions from each of the four microstate classes
to any other class (12 possibilities given the two directions
of the six possible pairings of microstates), normalized by
the total amount of microstate class transitions (X ? Y for
X = Y) was obtained for each participant. In this way, the
12 possible microstate transitions were assessed as micro-
state transition percentages. To examine directional asym-
metries in the transitions (‘directional predominance’)
between the six possible microstate pairs, directional pre-
dominance X$Y was calculated as difference of the two
transition percentages between two given microstate clas-
ses [(X ? Y)-(Y ? X)].
To assess the transition probabilities, ANOVAs were
computed with group as between-subject factor and micro-
state pairing (six possibilities) as within-subject factor.
In case of statistically interesting results, correlations
with the paranormal belief score were computed.
Results
Figure 1a shows the four averaged microstate map topog-
raphies for believers and for skeptics. The topographies of
the obtained classes A, B, C and D resemble the topogra-
phies of previous studies (Koenig et al. 1999, 2002). The
spatial distributions of the corresponding standard errors
are displayed in Fig. 1b (note that isopotential lines are in
steps of 1.0 units in Fig. 1a, of 0.1 units in Fig. 1b).
Figure 1c displays the t-values of the channel-wise
t-tests between the map topographies of the two groups.
TANOVA showed that the map topographies differed
significantly between groups for microstate A (P \ 0.001),
B (P = 0.003), and C (P = 0.002) but not for microstate
D. TANOVA showed that within both groups, all four
microstate map topographies differed significantly from
each other (P-values between P \ 0.01 and P \ 0.00001).
Viewed as channel-wise t-value topographies, in micro-
states class A, believers showed higher values right posterior
(t(max) = 4.32), skeptics left lateral (t(max) = -4.22). For
class B, believers had higher values right anterior (t(max) =
3.73), skeptics left posterior (t(max) = -3.44). For class C,
believers had higher values in the periphery (t(max) =
3.74), skeptics in central areas (t(max) = -3.81). For class
D, believers had higher values central right (t(max) = 1.51),
skeptics in central-posterior left (t(max) = -2.03).
For the three microstate parameters duration, occurrence
and coverage, a 2-factor ANOVA (group 9 microstate)
revealed no main effect of group but significant group by
microstate interactions for occurrence [F(3, 81) = 4.27;
Fig. 1 The four microstate classes A–D in believers (Bel) and
skeptics (Ske). a Mean potential distribution maps of the microstate
classes of believers and skeptics, normalized for equal field power.
Red and blue are the arbitrarily chosen color labels for areas of
opposite polarity; isopotential lines in steps of 1.0 units. b Spatial
distribution of standard errors of the mean; isopotential lines in steps
of 0.1 units. c Topography of the t-values of channel-wise t-tests of
differences between the potential distributions in believers and
skeptics; red: believers higher potential than skeptics, blue: skeptics
higher potential than believers. Iso-t-value lines in steps of t = 1.
Head seen from above (nose up, left ear left) (Color figure online)
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P = 0.007] and coverage [F(3.81) = 2.91; P = 0.039].
Post-hoc comparisons (Table 1) revealed that microstate
class B showed significant increases of occurrence and
coverage in believers compared to skeptics (P = 0.044 and
P = 0.023, respectively), and revealed that microstate class
C showed a tendency to decreases of occurrence and cov-
erage in believers (P = 0.093 and P = 0.064, respectively).
For class B, paranormal belief score correlated with
coverage (r = 0.43, N = 29, P = 0.019) and showed a
tendency to correlate with occurrence (r = 0.36, N = 29,
P = 0.053) but showed no correlation with duration. For
class C, paranormal belief score showed tendencies to
correlate negative with coverage and occurrence (r =
-0.34, N = 29, P = 0.070 and r = -0.35, N = 29,
P = 0.066, respectively).
The mean frequency of GFP peaks per second across all
participants decreased from microstate class A (21.44 ±
0.21 SE) to B (21.17 ± 0.22 SE) to C (20.89 ± 0.22 SE) to
D (20.80 ± 0.21 SE). GFP peaks frequency of class A dif-
fered from that of classes B, C and D at P = 0.07,
P = 0.0002, and P = 0.000001, respectively; that of class B
differed from C and D at P = 0.06 and P = 0.01, respec-
tively, while GFP peaks frequency did not differ significantly
between classes C and D. The results were similar in
believers and skeptics when separately examined.
For the directional predominances within the microstate
syntax, a 2-factor ANOVA (group 9 microstate pair)
revealed a significant interaction of group by microstate
pair [F(5.135) = 3.31; P = 0.007]. Post-hoc analysis
showed that believers differed significantly in their direc-
tional predominances for the microstate pairs A$B, A$C
and B$C (Table 2; Fig. 2).
This result is accounted for by the reversed directions of
directional predominance for believers and skeptics as
illustrated in Fig. 2 which shows that the microstate pairs
A$B, A$C and B$C constitute a quadruplet sequence A
to C to B to A in believers and an A to B to C to A
quadruplet sequence in skeptics. Figure 2 also displays the
P-values of the separate tests of these directional predo-
minances against the null hypothesis of no directional
predominance between microstate pairs.
Across all participants, the three involved directional
predominances correlated significantly with paranormal
belief: For (A to C)–(C to A) r = 0.43, P = 0.021; for
(C to B)-(B to C) r = 0.56, P = 0.001; and for (B to A)–
(A to B) r = 0.45, P = 0.015.
Based on these findings of directional predominance in
believers and skeptics, all possible quadruplets of the
microstates sequences A ? C?B ? A, C ? B?A ? C
and B ? A?C ? B (‘left-rotating’) as well as
A ? B?C ? A, B ? C?A ? B and C ? A?B ? C
(‘right-rotating’) were counted and expressed as percent-
ages of the total number of microstates for each participant.
The difference of left-rotating minus right-rotating qua-
druplet percentages was computed for each participant.
Comparing these differences between groups, believers
Table 1 Microstate parameters
Microstate class
A B C D
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Duration (ms)
Believers 74.86 11.29 86.01 16.15 89.21 16.35 82.20 15.25
Skeptics 77.28 15.18 78.70 25.28 93.35 14.06 81.72 22.18
t (df = 27) -0.48 0.91 -0.70 0.07
P 0.64 0.37 0.49 0.95
Occurrences/s
Believers 2.61 0.71 3.27 0.61 3.39 0.53 3.26 0.49
Skeptics 3.00 0.79 2.64 1.00 3.81 0.77 3.12 0.80
t (df = 27) –1.40 2.11 -1.74 0.58
P 0.17 0.044 0.093 0.57
Coverage (% time)
Believers 19.03 5.80 26.28 4.49 28.99 5.61 25.68 5.21
Skeptics 21.65 6.21 20.08 9.05 33.75 7.66 24.53 8.02
t (df = 27) -1.17 2.41 -1.93 0.47
P 0.25 0.023 0.064 0.65
Mean and standard deviation (SD) for 16 believers and 13 skeptics as well as tests for group differences (unpaired t-tests)
Bold values indicate P \ 0.05
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tended to have a higher preference for left quadruplets
than skeptics (0.67 ± 1.65% vs. -0.29 ± 0.66%; t =
1.97; df = 27; P = 0.059).
Discussion
The microstate features reflected the personality difference
between believers and skeptics. Rapid spontaneous
reorganization of large-scale neuronal activity, character-
ized by the EEG microstates, represents the brain’s ability
to flexibly react to and integrate various incoming infor-
mation. Hence, deviations in the tuning of the spontaneous
microstate parameters reflect differences in the cognitive
style and thus different dispositions to interpret the envi-
ronment, here expressed as belief in and skepticism of
paranormal phenomena.
Microstates of class B in believers compared to skeptics
showed increased occurrence; because there was no dif-
ference in duration, an increase in time coverage resulted.
Class B microstates have been associated with concrete/
visual imagery-type thoughts as opposed to microstate class
A which has been associated with abstract thoughts
(Lehmann et al. 1998, 2010). Microstate class B has been
correlated with negative BOLD signals in posterior occip-
ital regions that are dedicated to visual processing (Britz
et al. 2010). The same network had previously been iden-
tified as RSN 3 by Mantini et al. (2007). Thus, the present
result suggests that believers tend to spend more time with
thoughts of the concrete/visual imagery-type than skeptics.
On the other hand, microstates of class C in believers
compared to skeptics showed a tendency to decreased
occurrence that, in the absence of a difference in duration,
resulted in decreased time coverage. Microstate class C has
been correlated with positive BOLD signals in the ACC,
bilateral inferior frontal gyri as well as right insula (Britz et al.
2010) comparable to the regions of RSN 6 in Mantini et al.
(2007). Class C microstates have been suggested to involve
processing with reduced attention (Brandeis and Lehmann
1989; Koenig et al. 1999); this would suggest that believers
tend to spend less time in reduced attention than skeptics.
We note that microstate classes A and B because of their
higher GFP peaks frequencies imply higher neural activa-
tion levels, i.e. higher global excitation than the microstates
of classes C and D.
Since a given microstate is co-determined by its pre-
ceding microstate, one could speculate on inferences of the
Table 2 Directional predominances in the microstate syntax
Believers Skeptics Believers–skeptics
Mean SD t (df = 15) P (H0) Mean SD t (df = 12) P (H0) Mean diff. t (df = 27) P
A$B -0.51 1.41 -1.45 0.168 0.48 0.91 1.91 0.081 -0.99 -2.19 0.037
A$C 0.64 1.25 2.06 0.057 -0.41 0.82 -1.78 0.101 1.05 2.60 0.015
A$D 0.02 0.96 0.09 0.930 0.01 1.20 0.04 0.973 0.01 0.03 0.980
B$C -0.58 1.24 -1.87 0.082 0.91 1.13 2.91 0.013 -1.49 -3.34 0.002
B$D -0.03 1.69 -0.08 0.941 -0.21 1.37 -0.56 0.587 0.18 0.31 0.759
C$D 0.01 1.10 -0.05 0.960 0.46 1.49 1.10 0.291 -0.44 -0.92 0.366
Mean and standard deviation (SD) of the percentages of directional predominances [X$Y = (X ? Y)–(Y ? X)] for 16 believers and 13
skeptics. Test results for H0: X$Y = 0 are shown for each group (paired t-tests) as well as tests for group differences (unpaired t-tests)
Bold values indicate P \ 0.05
A B
C D
A B
C D
A B
C D
believers skeptics
believers vs skeptics
0.037
0.015 0.002
0.168
0.057 0.082
0.081
0.101 0.013
Fig. 2 Directional predominances of microstate concatenations for
the 16 believers and 13 skeptics. Letters indicate the microstate
classes A through D; lines indicate the six possible transitions
between pairs of microstate classes. Upper graph Directional
predominances differed significantly between believers and skeptics
for the concatenation of microstates of classes A, B and C;
P-values \ 0.05 are listed. Lower graphs Directional predominances
for the concatenation of the microstate classes A, B and C separately
illustrated for believers and skeptics show inverted sequencing. The
t-test results of the directional predominances between microstate
classes versus no directional predominances are listed
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successive steps of cognitive processes based on the
microstate syntax: In believers, a concrete thought (class B)
is followed by abstraction (class A) which in turn leads to
decreased attention with decreased excitation (class C),
while in skeptics, an abstract thought (class A) is followed
by concretization (class B) which in turn leads to decreased
attention with decreased excitation (class C). Vice versa,
decreased attention is followed by a concrete thought in
believers and by an abstract thought in skeptics. Certainly,
more research is needed to corroborate such speculative
interpretations in view of the very limited knowledge on
functional significance of the microstate classes.
Microstate classes A, B, and C differed significantly in
topography between believers and skeptics. It is obvious
that humans have more than four different types of thought,
even though the number of different thought types most
likely is quite limited. Our analysis forced all maps into the
four standard microstate classes that were repeatedly
reported as reviewed in the introduction. Hence, a given
microstate class in a given individual will consist of dif-
ferent topographies. In general, a given microstate class
must be assumed to encompass a relatively large repertoire
of related processing strategies. Differences between
groups in the composition of the repertoire of processing
strategies of a given class will be detectable as topographic
differences of microstates.
Even though the topography of a microstate class might
differ to some extent between participant groups, this
would not imply a fundamental difference because the
class designation was imposed by the class template that
optimized the assignment ensuring maximal difference to
the other classes (as a consequence, the topographies of the
four microstate classes differed significantly from each
other). But, for the same reason, the microstate classes
must imply fundamental differences in brain activity. Most
importantly, the topographies assigned to their microstate
classes behave in the same fashion, irrespective to indi-
vidual differences, i.e., they are anticorrelated to all the
other classes. As it has been well established in schizo-
phrenia studies, the microstate parameters reveal reliable
and consistent group differences across a large diversity of
participants, in spite of the variety of contributing map
topographies.
Microstate classes A and B displayed a significantly
stronger right-hemispheric activity in believers compared
to skeptics. This reflects the finding in the earlier wave
frequency-oriented analysis of the same data by Pizzagalli
et al. (2000) where believers compared to skeptics showed
a right-shifted gravity center of brain activity in the beta-2
frequency band, confirming a hypothesized right-hemi-
spheric functional predominance in people with tendencies
to paranormal ideation (Brugger and Graves 1997; Leon-
hard and Brugger 1998; Pizzagalli et al. 2001).
We note that the analysis approaches of the present
study and that of Pizzagalli et al. (2000) are completely
different: The present analysis classifies each momentary
time frame according to its topography and thereby dis-
tinguishes time epochs with different topographies. This
detects changes of the functional state of the brain at a
very high time resolution. Frequency decomposition is
not part of the approach. On the other hand, the Fourier
transformation and decomposition into ‘wave’ frequen-
cies (or frequency bands) convolutes the data over time
and therefore yields results that refer to the entire ana-
lyzed data. Because the two approaches examine the data
from completely different viewpoints, their results will
detect different aspects and thereby complement each
other.
Relating paranormal belief as one of the features of
schizotypal personalities to increased risk for schizo-
phrenia (Eckblad and Chapman 1983; Meehl 1962) leads
to the question whether the present results support a
relation between brain mechanisms of paranormal belief
and those of schizophrenia. Electrophysiological relations
between schizotypy and paranormal belief have been
discussed (Pizzagalli et al. 2000). However, the principal
deviations of microstate parameters in schizophrenia
(Irisawa et al. 2007; Kikuchi et al. 2007; Koenig et al.
1999; Lehmann et al. 2005; Strelets et al. 2003), i.e.,
decreased duration of classes B and D and increased
occurrence of A and C were not observed in the believers.
In fact, believers showed an opposing result, decreased
occurrence of C. Increased occurrence of B as seen in
believers had been reported only in one schizophrenia
study (Kikuchi et al. 2007). The scale-free dynamics of
microstates (see introduction) have been shown to depend
on microstate duration (Van De Ville et al. 2010), the
prominently deviant parameter in schizophrenia. Since our
groups did not differ in microstate durations, this would
suggest that the results represent short-term dependencies
that may not be visible in fMRI, i.e., after strong temporal
low-pass filtering. Microstate syntax fundamentally dif-
fered between the present study and findings in schizo-
phrenia: While believers and skeptics showed inverted
sequencing between microstate classes A, B, and C,
schizophrenics and normals showed inverted sequencing
between microstate classes A, C, and D (Lehmann et al.
2005). In sum, the present EEG microstate analysis
showed very little support for electrophysiological simi-
larities between paranormal beliefs and schizophrenia; this
would agree with the notion that paranormal belief may
exist without tendencies to psychosis (Goulding 2004;
McCreery and Claridge 2002).
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